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Abstract
A committee decides by unanimity whether to accept the current alterna-
tive, or to continue costly search. Alternatives are described by several distinct
attributes. Each committee member privately assesses the quality of one at-
tribute (her \specialty"). Preferences are heterogeneous and interdependent:
each specialist values all attributes, but puts a higher weight on her specialty
(partisanship). We study how acceptance standards, members' welfare and
expected search duration vary with the amount of conict within the commit-
tee. We compare decisions made by specialist committees to decisions made by
committees of generalists who can each assess all information available, and to
one-person decision making.
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11 Introduction
Leonardo da Vinci was a painter, sculptor, architect, musician, mathematician, en-
gineer, inventor, anatomist, geologist, cartographer and botanist. Isaac Newton was
(merely) a physicist, mathematician, astronomer, natural philosopher, alchemist,
master of the mint and theologian. Benjamin Franklin was an author, printer, polit-
ical theorist, postmaster, scientist, inventor, statesman, and diplomat.
These giants had probably little use for committees. But most complex decisions
in modern public or private organizations are taken by committees: Parliamentary
committees prepare and often control legislative outcomes through their superior
information; Hiring decisions for high-prole jobs that require multiple skills are made
or prepared by search committees, e.g., for a CEO, public administrator or university
professor; Investment decisions about various available projects are made by a board
of directors, or by a partnership of venture capitalists; Funding decisions for (possibly
interdisciplinary) research proposals are made by ad-hoc expert committees assembled
within science agencies; Technological standards are set by committees where various
experts represent rms within an industry, various industries on the producer or
consumer side, or several countries; Monetary policy is set by a board instead of a
sole governor in practically all important central banks.
Another ubiquitous feature of modern industrialized societies is the compartmen-
talization of knowledge. Just to give an example, medical specialization only started
around 1830 in the great Paris hospitals, while the past half century has seen a tremen-
dous increase in the number of medical specialties, along with the near disappearance
of the general practitioner.1
The causality relation between the above two phenomena seems obvious enough:
The trend towards more specialization { which implies that no single individual has
access to the entire necessary information { creates the necessity of delegating complex
choices among multi-dimensional alternatives to committees of \specialists", each
possessing information about some partial aspect of the problem at hand.2
But the possession of information that is not easily accessible to others creates
incentives for strategic manipulation. The lack of ecient information transmission
among specialized scientists was metaphorically bemoaned by Robert Oppenheimer
in 1954: \The specialization of science is an inevitable accompaniment of progress;
1For a history of specialization in the medical science see Weisz [2006].
2A lively debate takes place in the medical literature about the merits of specialists versus gen-
eralists. For example, Lowe et al [2000] study admission decisions for cardiac patients performed
by doctors with dierent trainings. The decision problem is multi-dimensional since many of these
patients suer from comorbidity { the presence of several serious other conditions.
2yet it is full of dangers, and it is cruelly wasteful since so much that is beautiful and
enlighted is cut o from most of the world."
The danger perceived by Oppenheimer would be less severe if the experts/specialists
in a committee would all rank the various feasible alternatives in the same way. But
it is often the case that specialization also leads to a form of \bias" or \partisanship"
{ the view that one own's information/speciality is more important than others. For
example, Hardy [1940], p.66 advises that: \It is one of the rst duties of a professor,
for example, in any subject, to exaggerate a little both the importance of his subject
and his own importance in it." Surely all learned readers of this article can oer some
empirical evidence to the eect that Hardy's advice is widely followed.
Dierences in the weighting of various attributes may be intrinsic or psychological
(\Anyone who defends his subject will nd that he is defending himself," Hardy
[1940], p. 144), or due to the fact that the decision makers are accountable to dierent
constituencies and are better informed about the eects of the decision on their own
constituency. One important example of the second type is oered by the monetary
policy board of the European Central Bank. Gruener and Kiel [2004] argue that
national central banks care about a policy that accommodates macroeconomic shocks
in their own country, but, due to demand spillover eects, shocks in one country
aect the desired policy in other participating countries. Moreover, they argue that
national central bankers have some private information about their own national
macroeconomic conditions (e.g., Greece during the last banking crisis). Another
example is oered by international decisions about environmental policy where the
nation states are interested in achieving less pollution in their own country, and
presumably possess private information about the national amount of emissions, the
costs to reduce emissions, or the economic consequences of a reduction. But it is
obvious that the environmental situation in one member state is co-determined by
the emissions in neighboring countries, and hence policy needs to be coordinated at
international conferences (e.g., the Kyoto or Copenhagen conferences).
If strong enough, the degree of partisanship within a committee implies that each
member will insist on a particularly high standard in his own speciality, leaving little
room for trade-os among the various attributes of each alternative. Such behavior
leads to delay in reaching decisions. Here is, for example, what Farell and Saloner
[1988] write in their inuential study of standard setting committees:
\More than a hundred thousand people meet regularly in committees with
the goal of reaching agreement on product and interface compatibility
standards. The resources devoted to this formal standardization activ-
ity have roughly doubled in the last decade. But these committees too
3are imperfect coordinators. Often, by the time a committee is convened,
participants have vested interests in incompatible positions, and the com-
mittee must resolve this conict. Since the \consensus principle" which is
generally accepted in voluntary standard setting, requires committees to
seek a stronger consensus than a simple majority vote (though not nec-
essarily unanimity), there may be a battle of wills in committee, while
users wait. Such waiting is costly, whether simply because of delay or
because eventually the participants can no longer wait, and the chance
for coordination has been missed."
In order to study the interaction among specialization, private information, and
partisanship in a dynamic framework where measuring delay is meaningful, we intro-
duce a novel model whose main ingredients are:
1. A stream of alternatives (or projects, or candidates) is presented to a commit-
tee who has to decide whether to accept the current alternative, or to continue
costly search (which can be seen as preserving a given status-quo). Thus, the
environment is dynamic and the current alternative is compared to an endoge-
nously determined continuation value rather than to a xed, exogenously given
outside option. This is a multi-person generalization of a classical one-person
optimal stopping or search problem (see Chow, Robbins and Siegmund [1971]
for a classical exposition).
2. Each alternative is described by a multi-dimensional bundle of several distinct
attributes. Each committee member is able to privately assess the quality of
one attribute (her \speciality"), but has only statistical knowledge about the
distribution of other relevant attributes. Thus, the game our agents play is one
with incomplete information.
3. Abstracting from informational issues (see also below), we follow here the ap-
proach of the so called \multi-attribute utility theory", a standard tool in deci-
sion analysis. The additive form of the utility function is the simplest, yet most
widely used form: it states that the utility of an alternative is the weighted sum
of the conditional utilities of the alternative's attributes, where the weights add
up to one (For a classical exposition, see Keeney and Raia [1976]).
4. The members' preferences are interdependent (i.e., there are both private and
common components) since the utility of each member is given by a convex
combination of his own private signal and the private signals of other members.
4We assume that committee members care most about the attribute about which
they are also privately informed, but other cases can be also treated.
In our present technical treatment we focus on unanimity decisions in a committee
with two members, but similar analyses for committees with more members who
employ other decision rules (e.g., voting by majority) can be performed using the same
tools. In particular, when alternatives are two-dimensional, a multi-person committee
with a unanimity acceptance rule will be controlled by at most two members: those
with the most stringent acceptance standard in each dimension, respectively.
Our main results study how acceptance standards, members' welfare and search
duration vary with the amount of partisanship (or conict), and compare the multi-
person committee decision under specialization to two benchmarks: (i) committees
without specialization, where all members are generalists and have access to all the
available information (thus there is complete information); (ii) one-person committees
(dictatorship).
It is important to point out that with extreme divergence of opinions, which cor-
responds here to the private values case (i.e., when each committee member puts all
the weight on the attribute corresponding to her own speciality) it makes no dier-
ence whether the committee members have private information or not. The reason
is that acceptance by member B (who votes based on information about her own
speciality) conveys no additional information directly aecting member A's utility.
Thus, whether A observes the attribute evaluated by B or not is inconsequential.
The situation dramatically changes when a member values attributes other than
her speciality, i.e., when there is less conict and values are interdependent. Then,
under complete information, a committee member accepts candidates whose weighted
combination of all observed attributes are above an optimal cuto. In the dynamic
search equilibrium, this cuto is precisely equal to the continuation value obtained
by not accepting the current candidate and continuing search.
Under incomplete information, behavior can be conditioned only on the single
observed attribute (the member's speciality), and member A imprecisely infers from
an acceptance by member B that the attribute monitored by B { which now directly
matters for A { is of relatively high quality. The continuation value is now given
by a convex combination of the acceptance cuto in A's speciality and the inferred
expected quality in the other dimension.
An interesting consequence of this dierence is that increased partisanship or
conict leads to a more lenient acceptance rule under complete information, but to a
more stringent rule under incomplete information! In particular, there are balanced
but not exceptional candidates who are accepted by the specialized committee, but
5rejected by the nonspecialized one. On the other hand, the specialized committee
rejects candidates who are excellent in just one dimension that would be accepted by
the generalist committee.
Although acceptance standards move in opposite directions, members' welfare in
both settings behave similarly. Roughly speaking, welfare in committees increases
with the covariance of the members' random utilities, where an increase in covariance
can stem either from an increase in the variance of the underlying attributes (an
eect that is shown to be benecial in one-person decisions), or from a decrease in
the degree of conict within the committee. In particular, when conict decreases
the members' random utilities become more associated, where \more association" is
a measure of positive dependence among random variables. Under specialization we
can also show that the search duration increases as the degree of conict increases.
It is obvious that a generalist dictator who possess information about all relevant
attributes cannot gain by forming a committee where power has to be shared with
others (unless the search costs can be passed to others). In contrast, when search
costs are not too high, we show that a specialist dictator always prefers to share
power and invite other specialists to the committee rather than take a partially un-
informed decision by himself. Moreover, the invited specialist is better o by joining
the committee rather than staying out and bearing the consequences of the dictator's
decision. This Pareto improvement holds provided that there is a minimal congruence
of interests among potential members, and is achieved in spite of a necessarily longer
search duration in the committee problem. We also show that a specialist committee
Pareto-dominates a generalist committee if the cost of assessing several dimensions
of the decision problem is \convex enough" in the number of dimensions. Thus, our
model yields intuitive explanations for the emergence of committees as a consequence
of specialization.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next subsection we review some related
literature. In Section 2 we present the basic committee decision model. In Section
3 we focus on the complete information/generalist benchmark. In Subsection 3.1 we
analyze a one-person decision problem. Proposition 1 shows that the dictator's ac-
ceptance cuto and utility increase if his preferences become more biased towards one
attribute. In Subsection 3.2 we analyze the committee problem under unanimity and
complete information. We prove the existence of a unique stationary and symmetric
equilibrium, and we show that both acceptance cuto and utility go down when the
members' preferences become more divergent, which corresponds to an increase in
the degree of conict within the committee (Proposition 2). Moreover, the cuto
under unanimity is always lower than the cuto under dictatorship. The nal result
6in this Section, Proposition 3, relates a decrease in conict (and hence an increase in
welfare) to a precise mathematical notion of positive dependence among random vari-
ables. The analysis in this Section uses insights from majorization theory. Section 4
is devoted to the incomplete information (or specialization) case. Proposition 4 looks
at the one-person decision problem where the dictator is informed only about one
attribute, and shows that the acceptance cuto, utility and search duration all go up
when the dictator's preference become more biased towards one attribute. Section 4.2
is devoted to the study of unanimity decisions under incomplete information. Propo-
sition 5 proves existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium in a general (not
necessarily symmetric) setting if the attributes' distributions have a strict decreasing
mean residual life (DMRL). Under the DMRL assumption, Propositions 6 analyzes
the eects of more extreme preferences on acceptance cutos and search duration in
possibly asymmetric committees. In particular, equilibrium search duration increases
when at least one committee member becomes more biased. Proposition 7 focuses
on symmetric settings: it proves the existence of an unique symmetric equilibrium,
and shows that both the acceptance cuto and expected search duration go up while
utility goes down when the degree of conict within the committee increases. It also
gives an upper bound on the increase of the search duration. Propositions 8 and 9
study the eects of stochastic increases in the attributes' distributions within, and
across committees, respectively. In Section 5 we rst compare the performance of
committees of specialists to that of committees of generalists. The analysis focuses
on the ratio between the cost of assessing several dimensions of the decision problem
and the cost of assessing a single dimension. Proposition 10 gives a simple bound
on this ratio ensuring that a specialist committee Pareto-dominates a generalist one.
Proposition 11 in Subsection 5.1 shows that forming a committee of specialized, par-
tially informed members also oers a Pareto improvement when compared to the
partially informed dictator case, despite the fact that the committee takes longer
to reach a decision. Section 6 concludes. In Appendix A we prove a partial result
about search duration under unanimity for a committee with generalists. Appendix
B contains several technical proofs omitted from the main text.
1.1 Related Literature
Decision making in committees is the subject of much scholarly work. A large majority
of the existing papers study static cases where the committee makes a decision just
once. We refer the reader to the survey by Li and Suen [2009] for a discussion of some
of the main topics addressed, and focus below on papers that incorporate committee
decisions within a formal search model.
7A small literature, originating during the mid 70's-80's in Statistics/Operations
Research, analyzes multi-person stopping games: a committee is presented with alter-
natives that arrive sequentially, and its members vote whether to accept the current
alternative or to continue search. Each alternative is characterized by a set of at-
tributes, and each committee member only cares about one attribute. This basic
framework with two players where stopping requires unanimous consent has been
rst analyzed by Sakaguchi [1973]. Kurano, Yasuda and Nakagami [1980] and Ya-
suda, Nakagami and Kurano [1982] establish equilibrium existence for environments
with more than two players and with more exible voting rules, e.g. majority. Fergu-
son [2005] points out that the voting games analyzed by these authors typically have
many non-trivial stationary equilibria, and oers conditions on the distribution of the
alternatives' attributes ensuring the existence of a unique stationary equilibrium for
the case of unanimous consent.
There is a more recent interest in collective search games in Economics. Wilson
[2001] and Compte and Jehiel [2010a] take a bargaining perspective: they study
environments where proposals are presented randomly and sequentially to a set of
bargainers who can accept or not. These authors relate the bargaining outcome when
players are very patient to the Nash Bargaining Solution. Compte and Jehiel also
analyze who has more (if any) eect on the decision, how search duration is aected by
the majority rule, and the impact of dimensionality on the size of the acceptance set.
Albrecht, Anderson and Vroman [2010] derive the existence of a unique symmetric and
stationary equilibrium for symmetric settings and general majority rules, and study
how the committee size and voting rules aect the search outcome. Compte and
Jehiel [2010b] compare majority rules with unanimity for large committees of very
patient agents. Alpern and Gal [2009] and Alpern, Gal and Solan [2010] consider
augmented voting games where the committee members can also veto candidates,
but have a restricted number of vetoes.
Lizzeri and Yariv [2010] consider a committee that decides every period whether to
continue deliberation (costly information gathering) or stop and make a nal decision
by voting. Under certain conditions, these authors show that voting rules are irrel-
evant while deliberation rules are critical for the determination of the duration and
accuracy of nal decisions. This theoretical nding is consistent with the experimen-
tal results documented in Goeree and Yariv [2010]. Strulovici [2010] studies a model
of collective experimentation by voting, and shows that collective decision making
often leads to an inecient level of experimentation. In his model a time-dependent
voting rule can restore eciency.
Although various aspects of aggregation of private information is a signicant
8topic in the static literature on decision making in committees (see for example Gilli-
gan and Krehbiel [1989], and Li, Rosen and Suen [2001]), all papers mentioned above
(that discuss dynamic settings) conduct a complete information analysis. The com-
bination of dynamic search, private information, multidimensional alternatives and
interdependent values is a distinctive feature of the present paper.
Damiano, Li and Suen [2009] study the role of delay for information aggregation
in a dynamic model of committee decision where committee members possess private
information and have conicting preferences. In their model members repeatedly vote
on a decision { which is taken only once { until an agreement is reached.
Several static models of decision making in committees allow for interdependent
values. For example, Gruener and Kiel [2004] consider direct revelation mechanisms in
a static committee decision model with private information, interdependent values and
a one-dimensional set of alternatives. Caillaud and Tirole [2007] focus on strategies for
consensus building within a group and dene a measure of internal congruence among
committee members in order to capture the correlation among the members benets.
Mathematically, this is connected to our notion of degree of conict or partisanship
since both are related to measures of positive dependence among random variables.
We wish to mention here that several important tools in establishing both the
uniqueness of stationary Bayes-Nash equilibria in the incomplete information case,
and many of our comparative statics results revolve around the concept of mean
residual life of a random variable, which is borrowed from reliability theory (see
Shaked and Shanthikumar [2007], Chapter 2). Another important set of concepts
and tools is borrowed from (stochastic) majorization theory (see the classical treatise
by Marshall and Olkin [1979]).
2 The Model
We choose to present the model in a specic and familiar setting of a recruiting
committee. As mentioned in the introduction, our analysis applies more broadly to
other committee decision frameworks.
A hiring committee is in charge of lling an open position. Candidates are
evaluated one at a time. In each period t the current candidate is evaluated on the
basis of two attributes Xt and Yt, where Xt and Yt are non-negative random variables
(say theoretical skills and empirical skills in an Economics department). These two
attributes are drawn independently of each other, and independently across periods
from commonly known distributions F and G, respectively. Both F and G have nite




, where  
9+1:3
The committee consists of two members, A and B. Member A (B) is specialized
in evaluating attribute X (Y ), and privately observes the realization of this random
variable.
The committee members view the value of a candidate in possibly dierent ways:
each member is biased towards hiring a candidate that is strong in his own respective
eld of specialization. This is captured here by assuming that, net of search costs,
the payo for member A from hiring a candidate (x;y) is given by x + (1   )y
with   1=2. Net of search costs, the payo of member B from hiring a candidate
(x;y) is given by x + (1   )y with   1=2: That is, member A puts relatively
more weight on attribute x and member B puts relatively more weight on attribute
y. Higher values of  and 1    represent here a higher degree of conict within the
committee, or more partisanship.
After each assessment, members simultaneously cast votes of \yes" or \no".4 A
candidate is hired and search stops if both members vote \yes", otherwise search
continues. In the latter case, member A incurs cost cA and member B incurs a cost
cB, and the process repeats itself5. Once rejected, a candidate cannot be recalled. In
the sequel we always focus on equilibria where search ends in nite time, in order to
avoid the trivial equilibria where one agent never votes \yes".
3 Complete Information: Generalist Committees
We start our analysis with a discussion of the setting where the decision makers
observe and can assess the current realizations of both attributes (but are uncer-
tain about the future candidates). Thus, there is complete information, and agents
are generalists. Roughly speaking, the analysis is more complex in the generalist
case because the committee members need to condition their behavior on the sum
(convolution) of two random variables corresponding to the two attributes instead of
conditioning on the single attribute corresponding to their own speciality.
3.1 One-person Committees (Dictatorship)
Suppose rst that member A alone controls the decision. We assume that this \dic-
tator" incurs a search cost cD and observes both realizations xt and yt. Letting
Z = Zt = Xt+(1   )Yt; we obtain an instance of the classical search problem rst
3The assumption of common support is just for convenience of notation.
4Under the unanimity rule, simultaneity does not matter.
5These can be thought of as time costs, evaluation costs, etc....
10analyzed in Chow and Robbins [1960], where the decision maker directly observes the
realization of Z; which also gives the dictator's period utility in case of stopping. It
is well known that the optimal policy is determined by a cuto zD that is constant
over time: in any period, the dictator accepts the current candidate if and only if
Z  zD.6 Let vD denote the continuation payo of the dictator when he chooses the
cuto zD optimally. We have then
vD =  cD + E [Z j Z  zD]Pr(Z  zD) + [1   Pr(Z  zD)]vD:
It also follows from optimality that vD = zD. Therefore, the equilibrium condition
for the cuto zD is given by:
E [Z   zD j Z  zD]Pr(Z  zD) = cD: (1)
The left hand side of the above equation is decreasing in zD; and hence the solution
is unique. In order to analyze how the optimal cuto/dictator's utility varies with
the degree of bias , we introduce a few concepts from majorization theory.
Denition 1 Let a(1)  a(2)  :::  a(n) and b(1)  b(2)  :::  b(n) denote the in-
creasing arrangement of vector a = (a1;a2;:::;an) and b = (b1;b2;:::;bn), respectively.










b(i) for all j = 1;:::;n   1:
Denition 2 A function f : Rn ! R is Schur-convex (concave) if for a;b 2 Rn,
a  b )f (a)  () f (b):
A symmetric and convex (concave) function is Schur-convex (concave). Note (also
for further reference) that for a = (1   1;1) and b = (1   2;2) where 1  1
2 and
2  1
2; the assertion a  b is equivalent to 1  2. We also need the following
result, which is a special case of a theorem due to Marshall and Proschan [1965] (see
also Result B.2.c. in page 288 of Marshall and Olkin [1979]).
Theorem 1 (Marshall and Proschan [1965]) If X1;:::;Xn are exchangeable ran-




is symmetric and convex, and hence Schur-convex.
6Note that recall is never optimal in such a setting.
11We are now ready to prove:
Proposition 1 Assume that F = G. Then the dictator's cuto (or utility) zD is
increasing in .
Proof. For a xed zD; let g(t) = (t   zD)  1ftzDg where 1fg denotes the indicator
function. Then g is clearly continuous and convex. The random variables X and Y
are exchangeable since they are I:I:D. By the above Theorem, we obtain that
(a1;a2) = Eg(a1X + a2Y ) = E[(a1X + a2Y   zD)  1fa1X+a2Y zDg]
is Schur convex. Hence, by the remark before the Theorem, the function  () =
Eg(X + (1   )Y ) is increasing in  for   1
2: The left hand side of equation
(1), E [Z   zDjZ  zD]Pr(Z  zD), viewed as a function of  is precisely equal to
 : It is also clear that the same expression, viewed as a function of zD; is decreasing.
Therefore, the equilibrium cuto zD satisfying equation (1) must be increasing in .
Remark 1 Marshall and Proschan's Theorem can also be invoked to show that
P
aiXi
is second-order stochastically dominated by
P
biXi whenever a  b.7 Thus, a change
in preferences, corresponding to an increase in , has here the same benecial eect
on utility as an increase in the variability of the candidate's attribute in a standard
one-dimensional search model.
Another important issue is how a change in  aects the search duration, which
is inversely related to the acceptance probability. An increase in  has two eects
on the acceptance probability. First, an increase in  directly aects the acceptance
probability for a xed cuto zD. This eect is ambiguous and depends on the distri-
bution. Second, as  increases, the optimal cuto zD increases, leading to a reduction
of the acceptance probability. The overall eect of an increase in  on search duration
is ambiguous, as illustrated in the following examples.
Example 1 Suppose that both F and G are uniform on the interval [0;1]. The search

















7The proof uses the same reasoning as above, but for an arbitrary convex function g instead of
g(t) = (t   zD)  1ftzDg. This is Theorem 3.A.35 in Shaked and Shanthikumar [2007], but their
proof is somewhat less transparent.
12Therefore, the equilibrium cuto is zD = 1  
3 p
6(1   )cD, which increases in .














is increasing in , and thus the expected search duration decreases in .
Example 2 Suppose F (s) = G(s) = 1   e s for s 2 [0;1). Equation (1) becomes


















Fix cD = 0:01 (note that this is quite small compared to the mean of the distribution).
As  increases from 0:6 to 0:8, the optimal cuto zD increases from 3:1 to 3:7, while
the search duration increases from 61 to 80.
3.2 Unanimity among Generalists
Suppose now that the decision is controlled by a committee with two members.
At time t each member observes both realizations xt and yt of the current candi-
date/alternative's attributes, and a decision is taken by unanimity. Dene a sequence
of I.I.D. random variables fZtg
1
t=1 where Zt = (ZAt;ZBt) is given by:
ZAt = Xt + (1   )Yt;
ZBt = Xt + (1   )Yt:
With this transformation, the setting is similar to the one where the committee mem-
bers observe ZAt and ZBt directly (see Ferguson [2005]), except that we explicitly spell
out the interdependence in the preferences. In principle, a member's voting strategy
may depend on the whole history of the game. We focus however on stationary equi-
libria that employ cuto strategies: each member votes \yes" if and only if his/her
evaluation of the candidate's worth exceeds a cuto that does not change over time.
Since the realizations of both attributes are public, members A and B will impose
cutos on ZAt and ZBt, respectively. If we denote by zA and zB the equilibrium cutos
employed by members A and B, respectively, then member A (B) votes \yes" if and
only if zAt  zA (zBt  zB).
Let vA denote the continuation value of member A when member A follows his/her
optimal strategy given the equilibrium strategy of member B. The continuation value
13vB of member B is dened analogously. As in the previous one-person case, it must
hold that vA = zA and vB = zB. It also follows from the denition of vA that
vA =  cA + E [ZA j ZA  zA;ZB  zB]Pr(ZA  zA;ZB  zB)
+[1   Pr(ZA  zA;ZB  zB)]vA:
By substituting zA for vA we obtain our rst equilibrium condition:
E [ZA   zA j ZA  zA;ZB  zB]PrfZA  zA;ZB  zBg = cA: (2)
Following the same procedure, we obtain our second equilibrium condition:
E [ZB   zB j ZA  zA;ZB  zB]PrfZA  zA;ZB  zBg = cB: (3)
If (zA;zB) is an equilibrium with PrfZA  zA;ZB  zBg > 0, then (zA;zB) must
satisfy the above two equilibrium conditions. Equilibrium existence is established by
Yasuda, Nakagami and Kurano [1982]. The equilibrium may not be unique, as illus-
trated by examples in Ferguson [2005]. But we show below that a unique symmetric
equilibrium exists if the setting is symmetric, i.e., if F = G,  = 1  and cA = cB.
How do the recruiting standard and welfare vary with respect to , the degree of
conict within the committee in this equilibrium? The answer may seem ambiguous
since  has two opposite eects: on the one hand, an increase in  increases variability
which is benecial, as shown under dictatorship (see Remark 1); on the other hand,
an increase in  shrinks the acceptance region. The key insight for the next result
is to look instead at the sum of the members' utilities which equals Xt + Yt for any
candidate, and is therefore independent of . We show below that the acceptance
cuto always goes down when  increases, contrasting the result in the one-person
decision problem.
Proposition 2 Suppose that F = G;  = 1  , and cA = cB = c. Then there exists
a unique symmetric equilibrium (z;z) that is characterized by
E [ZA   z j ZA  z;ZB  z]Pr(ZA  z;ZB  z) = c: (4)
The equilibrium cuto z (and thus each member's payo) is decreasing in . More-
over, z  zD, the dictator's optimal cuto under the same F; ; and c:
Proof. The equilibrium condition (4) is obtained from (2) by setting zA = zB = z.
The existence and uniqueness follow from the observation that the left hand side of
(4) is strictly decreasing in z.
14Since in the symmetric setting X = Xt and Y = Yt are I.I.D., we obtain:
E [ZA   z j ZA  z;ZB  z]Pr(ZA  z;ZB  z)
= E
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(X + Y   2z)  1fX+(1 )Y z;(1 )X+Y zg











 1fX+(1 )Y z;(1 )X+Y zg

= c (5)
Observe that function on the right hand side is Schur-concave in (;1   ) because
the indicator function is Schur-concave, and because the function 1
2X + 1
2Y   z does
not depend on , and is positive whenever the indicator function is not equal to zero.
Thus, the right hand side decreases with . Since it also obviously decreases with z;
we obtain that the equilibrium cuto decreases in :
For the last assertion, note that zD(1
2) = z(1
2); since the equilibrium conditions















By Proposition 4 we know that zD() increases in : The result follows because z ()
decreases with ; as shown above.
The intuition for the above result is as follows. For a xed acceptance cuto z,
the acceptance area under unanimity is given by
f(x;y) : x + (1   )y  z;(1   )x + y  zg:
When , the degree of conict within the committee, increases from 1=2 to 1, the









As a result, a successful search takes more periods, which means that both members
have to incur higher expected search costs if they keep the same standard. To counter
this eect, both members lower their acceptance standard and settle on less desirable
candidates, striking a balance between candidate quality and search costs.
Example 3 Suppose that both F and G are uniform on the interval [0;1], and that
 = 1    and cA = cB = c. Assume also that the cost c is small enough so















(x + (1   )y   z)dydx
=
1
62 (4   1)(1   z)
3 :
Therefore, the equilibrium cuto is



























16is decreasing in , which implies that the expected search duration increases in  in
this example.
Remark 2 Recall that an increase in the degree of conict  leads to a decrease in
the second order stochastic dominance order of the random utility X+(1 )Y (and
hence to an increase in its variance), which was shown to be benecial for dictators.
But we also showed that the members' payos in committees decrease in ; which
seems puzzling. But what is the benet for member A of an increased variance if
member B says "no" to the better candidates? What A really needs is that the expected
value of B's utility, conditional on A's utility being high, is also high. Only then search
stops in a committee. Note that the covariance of the members' random utilities
Cov[X + (1   )Y;Y + (1   )X] = 2(1   )V ar(X)
is increasing in the variance of the underlying attributes, but is decreasing in the
degree of conict  on [1
2;1]. Thus, our results show that the consensus eect is
dominant in committees. This observation about the role of the covariance suggests a
deeper mathematical connection: indeed, when conict decreases, the members' ran-
dom utilities become more associated, where \more association" is a well known
measure of positive dependence among random variables, due to Schriever [1987].8
Incidentally, in his original paper, Schriever has proven the following:
Proposition 3 (Schriever [1987]): Consider a pair of random variables (X; Y ),
and let H denote the joint distribution function of the linear transform T(X;Y ) =
(X+(1 )Y; (1 )X+Y ); where  2 [1
2;1]: Then   0 implies H assoc H0.9
4 Incomplete Information: Specialist Committees
In this section we come back to our original model where the committee members are
specialized and are able to privately assess the quality of the alternative/candidate
in only one dimension. We start with a brief discussion of the very simple one-person
problem.
8See also Chapter 9 in Shaked and Shanthikumar [2007] for the relations between this order and
other notions such as positive quadrant dependency, or the supermodular order. In general, more
positive dependence implies a higher covariance.
9The proof follows directly from the denition of the association order by observing that each T
is monotonically increasing in each coordinate, and that the determinant of the Jacobian of T0(T 1
 )
is non-negative.
174.1 One-person Committees (Dictatorship)
The dictator (member A) incurs a search cost cA and only observes the realization of
Xt. Let xD denote the cuto employed by the dictator. Then we have the Bellman
equation
vD =  cA + max
xD
fE [X + (1   )Y j X  xD]Pr(X  xD) + [1   Pr(X  xD)]vDg






[x + (1   )y]dF (x)dG(y) + F (xD)vD
)
The rst-order condition for xD implies that
vD = xD + (1   )E [Y ]:
Note that here the equilibrium cuto and the equilibrium utility do not coincide,
a fact with numerous consequences in the multi-person committee decisions prob-
lem analyzed below. From the Bellman equation we obtain the following equilibrium
condition for xD:
E [X   xD j X  xD][1   F (xD)] = cA: (6)
Proposition 4 There is a unique equilibrium acceptance cuto xD: This cuto, the
dictator's utility vD and the expected search duration are all strictly increasing in .
Proof. The implications follow immediately from the fact the left hand side of
equation (6) is strictly increasing in  and strictly decreasing in xD. Note that the
acceptance probability is 1 F (xD), which is decreasing in . Therefore, the expected
search duration also increases in .
4.2 Unanimity among Specialists
We now turn to committee decisions with specialized, privately informed members.
Given a candidate with attributes (xt;yt), member A privately observes xt and mem-
ber B privately observes yt. Acceptance is by unanimity. We focus on stationary
equilibria that employ cuto strategies. Each member casts her vote based on her
own information only. Specically, if we let x and y denote the cutos used by
member A and B, respectively, then member A votes \yes" if and only if xt  x,
and member B votes \yes" if and only if yt  y.
184.2.1 Equilibrium Characterization
With some abuse of notation, let vA denote the continuation value member A derives
by following his optimal strategy given the equilibrium strategy of member B. The
continuation value vB of member B is dened similarly. Then the Bellman equation
for member A becomes
vA =  cA + max
x
(
E [X + (1   )Y j X  x;Y  y]Pr(X  x;y  y)
+[1   Pr(X  x;Y  y)]vA
)





y [x + (1   )y]dG(y)dF (x)
+[1   (1   F (x))(1   G(y))]vA
)
(7)
By looking at the necessary rst-order condition for x in the Bellman equations
above, one immediately obtains the relations between cutos and utilities, as stated
in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 The relationships between the continuation values vA;vB and the optimal
cuto x;y are given by
vA = x
 + (1   )E[Y j Y  y
]; (8)
vB = E [XjX  x
] + (1   )y
: (9)
Intuitively, conditional on being pivotal (i.e., Y  y), member A is indierent
between accepting the marginal candidate with X = x and continuing costly search.
Therefore, the continuation value vA must be equal to the expected payo from hiring
the marginal candidate, which is x + (1   )E[Y j Y  y]. In contrast to the
complete information setting, here the equilibrium cuto and the equilibrium utility
do not coincide: the opponent's cuto y aects not only the probability of acceptance,
but also the expected worth of the marginal candidate.
Since X and Y are independent, the Bellman equation can be re-written as
vA = E[X j X  x
] + (1   )E[Y j Y  y
]  
cA
(1   F (x))(1   G(y))
: (10)
That is, the expected payo for member A is equal to the expected value of the chosen
alternative minus the expected search costs. Using the rst-order condition (8), we
obtain our rst equilibrium condition:
1







The second equilibrium condition can be obtained similarly:
1







19The two conditions (11) and (12) characterize the stationary equilibrium cutos
(x;y).
Remark 3 There is an important formal link between the analysis of complete in-
formation with private values and the analysis of incomplete information
with interdependent values. In the complete information case with  = 1  = 1,




E [X   zAjX  zA] =
1
cB
E [Y   zBjY  zB] =
1
[1   F (zA)][1   G(zB)]
:













[1   F (x)][1   G(y)]
If we dene A = cA= and B = cB=(1   ) as the \pseudo-cost" in the incomplete
information case, then the sets of cuto equilibrium conditions coincide. Therefore,
while the welfare analysis is dierent, properties of the acceptance cutos in a complete
information framework with private values can be directly applied to a setting with
incomplete information and interdependent values. Note that when  = 1 and  = 0,
the pseudo costs are equal to the usual costs. Therefore, in the private values setting,
whether members' information is private or not does not aect the equilibrium.
Before discussing the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, we rst intro-
duce an important concept used in the theory of reliability.








E [X   xjX  x] if x < 
0 if x = 
If we let X denote the life-time of a component, then m(x) measures the ex-
pected remaining life of a component that has survived until time x. The MRL
function is closely related to the more familiar hazard rate (or failure rate) (x) =
f (x)=[1   F (x)] which measures the instantaneous failure probability conditional on
survival up to time x.10 Both measures are conditional concepts (and uniquely deter-
mine the underlying distribution), but they are conceptually dierent: the hazard rate








dt for x < .
20(x) only takes into account the instantaneous present, while the mean residual life
m(x) takes into account the complete future (see Guess and Proschan [1988]). The
exponential distribution is the only distribution that has a constant mean residual
life, and it is also the only distribution that has a constant hazard rate.
Denition 4 1. A random variable X satises the (strict) DMRL (decreasing
mean residual life) property if m(x) is (strictly) decreasing in x.
2. A random variable X satises the IFR (increasing failure rate) property if (x)
is increasing in x.
The IFR assumption is commonly made in the economics literature. DMRL is a
weaker property, and it is implied by IFR. We are now ready to state the rst main
result of this section.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the random variables X and Y satisfy the strict DMRL
property. Then the unanimity game among specialists has a unique cuto equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The assumption of strict DMRL is critical for the uniqueness result. If this as-
sumption fails, then multiple equilibria are possible, as illustrated in the following
example.
Example 4 Suppose F (s) = G(s) = 1   e s for s 2 [0;1),  = 1    and cA =




 = ln   lnc:
Any two non-negative numbers (x;y) satisfying the above condition form an equi-








How do the equilibrium acceptance cutos vary with respect to the degree of conict
within the committee when its members are specialized and have private information?
Using the DMRL condition we can show for any (possibly asymmetric) setting that
when just one member becomes more extreme, he raises his own acceptance stan-
dard, while the other member responds by lowering her standard. Intuitively, a more
extreme position should also lead to a longer search duration.
21Proposition 6 Suppose that both X and Y satisfy the strict DMRL condition, and
consider the unique equilibrium for given cA;cB and . Keeping  constant, member
A's equilibrium cuto x and the expected search duration increase in  , while member
B's equilibrium cuto y decreases in .
Proof. Suppose  < 0 and let (x;y) and (x0;y0) denote the cutos corresponding
to  and 0, respectively. We need to show x0 > x and y0 < y. Suppose rst x0  x
and y0 < y. Then it follows from the equilibrium condition and the DMRL property
that
1





















(1   F (x0))(1   G(y0))
;





























which violates the equilibrium conditions for (x0;y0). Finally, suppose x0 > x and
y0  y. Then we have
1















(1   F (x0))(1   G(y0))
a contradiction of x0 > x and y0 > y. Therefore, we must have x0 > x and y0 < y.
The equilibrium expected search duration is given by
1









E [Y   y
jY  y
]:
22It is not a priori clear from the equilibrium condition for x (the rst equality) whether
search duration increases or not. But, we also know that y decreases in : Therefore,
from the second equality we obtain that the expected search duration necessarily
increases if X and Y have the DMRL property.
We next look at a symmetric setting. Although the members' utilities decrease
when there is more conict { as was also the case under complete information/no
specialization { the equilibrium acceptance cuto goes up with the degree of conict,
in sharp contrast to the unanimity decision in the complete information/no special-
ization case!
Proposition 7 Suppose that F = G;  = 1  , and cA = cB = c: Then there exists
a unique symmetric cuto equilibrium (x;x)11. Both the cuto x and expected
search duration S are strictly increasing in , but the members' utilities are strictly
decreasing in . Moreover, if X and Y have the DMRL property, then for any
;0 2 [1









Proof. The uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium follows by the same argument as
that in the case of generalist committees (see Proposition 2). Since in the symmetric
setting X and Y are I.I.D., we obtain:
E [X   x




















































Observe that function on the left hand side is strictly increasing in  because the
function 1
2X + 1
2Y   x is positive whenever the indicator function is not equal to
zero. Since the left hand side strictly decreases in x; we obtain that the equilibrium
cuto must strictly increase in . As a consequence, the expected search duration,
11Recall that under the strict DMRL assumption this is also the overall unique equilibrium.






















To prove the result about utilities, we adapt equation (10) to the symmetric setting
and obtain
vA = E [XjX  x
] + (1   )E [XjX  x
]  
c
[1   F (x)]
2
= E [XjX  x
]  
c
[1   F (x)]
2
=
[1   F (x)]
R 
x sf (s)ds   c
[1   F (x)]
2 :
Therefore, vA can be written as vA (x), a function of x only. Since x strictly
increases in ; in order to show that vA is strictly decreasing in , it is sucient to




[1   F (x)]
3
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1   F (x)




for all  > 1=2: Therefore, members' utilities are strictly decreasing in .

























 1fX+(1 )Y z;(1 )X+Y zg

= c:
In the game among specialists, raising the degree of conict while keeping the ac-
ceptance cuto xed raises the stakes controlled by each member without aecting
the acceptance area. Thus, committee members respond by raising the cuto. In
contrast, in the game among generalists raising the degree of conict while keep-
ing the acceptance cuto xed has no eect on the controlled stake, but decreases
24the acceptance area. Thus, committee members respond by lowering the acceptance
cuto.
Alternatively, we can get the intuition for the specialization case by focusing on
the search cost c. An important observation stemming from Remark 3 is that with
incomplete information the degrees of conict ( or ) and the search costs (cA or
cB) aect equilibrium play only through the \pseudo-costs", A and B. Moreover,
a higher  has exactly the same eect on the equilibrium cutos as a lower search
cost cA. It is intuitive that a decrease in search cost c leads to an increase in the
equilibrium cutos, so we can again conclude that the equilibrium cutos must be
increasing in .
Analogous to the complete information case, individual payos decrease when
the degree of conict increases. As we pointed out earlier, with incomplete infor-
mation the continuation payos are dierent from equilibrium cutos. This obser-
vation holds the key to understand why members' utilities decrease although the
equilibrium cuto increases in . In particular, member A's payo is given by
vA = x + (1   )E [Y jY  y]. In the symmetric setting, it holds that x = y
and x < E [Y jY  y]. Therefore, an increase in  has two eects on vA: a higher 
leads to a higher cuto and thus to an increase of both terms in vA, while a higher 
also shifts weight from the larger term E [Y jY  y] to the smaller term x and thus
lowers vA. It turns out the second eect dominates, and thus vA is decreasing in .
Finally, we investigate how the equilibrium varies when we change the distribution
of the candidate's attributes. We rst need to introduce several stochastic orders,
which, intuitively, should be connected to the mean residual life, or to its close cousin,
the hazard rate.
Denition 5 1. Let m and l denote the mean residual life function of random
variables X and Y , respectively. Then X is said to be smaller than Y in the





2. Let r and q denote the hazard rate function of random variables X and Y ,
respectively. Then X is said to be smaller than Y in the hazard rate order,





The MRL order is independent of the usual stochastic order (denoted by ST), and
neither implies the other. The hazard rate order HR implies both MRL and ST,





if e X MRL X and E e X = EX, then e X second-order stochastically dominates X; and
hence e X has a lower variance than X (see Shaked and Shanthikumar [2007] for all
these results).
25Our rst result shows that, within a given committee, the member who observes
a stochastically higher attribute in the MRL sense imposes a higher equilibrium ac-
ceptance standard, and is better o.
Proposition 8 Suppose that both X and Y satisfy the strict DMRL condition,  =
1   ; and cA = cB = c. If X MRL Y , then in the unique equilibrium it holds that
x  y and vA  vB:12
Proof. See Appendix B.
Our second result looks across committees, and shows the members' acceptance
standards and utilities go up given a stochastic improvement in the privately observed
attributes. Here we need the improvement to be in the sense of the stronger hazard
rate order.
Proposition 9 Consider a symmetric committee C1 where attributes are governed
by I.I.D random variables X and Y , and another symmetric committee C2 where
attributes are governed by I.I.D. random variables e X and e Y . Suppose that X satises
the DMRL property, and that e X HR X. Then, for any  = 1    and c, the accep-
tance cuto and the members' utilities in the respective unique symmetric equilibrium
are higher in committee C1 than in C2:13
Proof. See Appendix B.
:
5 The Relative Performance of Specialist Commit-
tees
In this section we rst compare the performance of committees of specialists to that
of committees of generalists. The analysis focuses on the cost of assessing several
dimensions of the decision problem. We next discuss the incentives of a specialist
\dictator" (who is only informed about one dimension of the problem) to involve in
the decision making process a specialist on a dierent dimension: there is a trade-o
between sharing power and gaining valuable information.
12Thomas Watson, the founder of IBM is said to have advised: \If you want to be more successful,
increase your failure rate." Our result shows that increasing mean residual life is sucient, at least
in committee interactions.
13Recall that these are the overall unique equilibria if X and e X satisfy the strict DMRL condition.
265.1 Specialist Committees versus Generalist Committees
We focus here on the symmetric setting with F = G,  = 1    and cA = cB and
compare the performances of specialist versus generalist committees. Their relative
performance certainly depends on ratio of respective search costs. Let cg denote the
search cost incurred by a generalist to evaluate both attributes, and let cs denote the
search cost incurred by each specialist to evaluate the single attribute in her specialty.










 1fX+(1 )Y z;(1 )X+Y zg

= cg; (14)














Let us rst consider the benchmark case where a generalist enjoys a very strong
return to scope in knowledge, so that cg = cs. When  = 1 the above two equilibrium
conditions coincide and we have z = x. As shown in Propositions 2 and 7, the optimal
cutos move in opposite directions for lower degrees of conict. This immediately
implies that for any ; the equilibrium cuto z under complete information is always
higher than the equilibrium cuto x under incomplete information. It is intuitive that
a specialized committee rejects candidates who are excellent in just one dimension
(candidates in area A and B) that would be accepted by generalists. But, we also
obtain that there are always balanced candidates with attributes above and close
to (x;x) (candidates in area C in the gure) who are accepted by the specialized
committee while being rejected by the generalist one. The acceptance areas in these












27In practice, however, a generalist who is able to assess several dimensions of a
complex problem may have less precise information about each than a specialist.
Alternatively, in order to obtain the same quality of information as several specialists
(one for each dimension), a generalist may face a cost function that is convex in the
number of assessed dimensions, i.e. the cost incurred by a generalist for assessing
an additional dimension is higher than the cost incurred by a specialist who only
assesses that particular dimension. Under a simple condition on the distribution of
attributes, our next Proposition shows that a specialist committee outperforms a
generalist committee if the generalist cost is convex enough, i.e. if the cost ratio cg=cs
is high enough14.
Proposition 10 Suppose that F = G and that F is convex15. Consider a generalist
committee where each member faces cost cg; and a specialist committee where each
member faces cost cs such that cg=cs  4. Then for any  = 1    2 [1=2;1]; hiring
standards and members' utilities are higher in the specialist committee than in the
generalist committee.








































































































14Related conditions on the cost ratio are also sucient for a specialist committee to dominate a
generalist dictator.




















where x are the optimal cutos in the specialist and generalist committees,
respectively.
We know from Propositions 2 and 7 that x() is increasing in  and that z()









implies x () > z () for all  2
[1=2;1]. Furthermore, a member's utility in the specialist committee is given by
x() + (1   )E [Y jY  x()] > x () > z () for all . Therefore, a member's
utility is higher in a specialist committee than in a generalist committee.
The above condition cg=cs  4 is a lower bound that works for many distributions.
For specic distributions sharper results can be obtained. The next example shows
that cg=cs  2 (i.e., a cost function that is linear in the number of assessed dimensions)
is sucient for the specialist committee to dominate the generalist committee if the
distribution of attributes is uniform.
Example 5 (Uniform) Assume that both F and G are uniform on [0;1]. Suppose
that cg = 2cs. Then the equilibrium cutos are given by
















A member's utility in a specialist committee is given by
v() = x
 + (1   )E [Y jY  x





while a member's utility in a generalist committee coincides with the cuto z () . It
is easy to verify that v () > z () for all  2 [1=2;1].
5.2 The Emergence of Committees and Their Management
Whenever there are conicts of interests, a completely informed, generalist dictator
(say member A) obviously stands to lose if he invites member B to form a committee
and share the power of choosing the suitable course of action. Thus, whenever deci-
sion power is asymmetrically distributed, a lack of specialization suggests that most
decisions will be made by the authority person who is in power.
As we remarked in the introduction, modern technological societies seem to pursue
an inexorable path towards more specialization. It is intuitive, and we show it below,
that under specialization, a potential dictator A who is well informed only about
one dimension of the problem at hand stands to gain by forming a committee with
29another member B who is informed about another dimension. Moreover, informed
members who were excluded from decision making also gain by aecting the decision
within a committee, even when the extra search cost is taken into account. In spite
of the fact that the expected search duration in a committee is higher than under
dictatorship, this conclusion holds even for large degrees of conict between A and B
if the search costs are suciently small.
In other words, a late informed decision is better than an early uninformed one.
Thus, the trend to more specialization oers a natural explanation for the observed
increased frequency of decisions by committees, and for the often bemoaned increase
in delay of reaching those decisions.
To make the above argument precise, consider then the specialized dictator's prob-
lem: member A is the dictator who incurs a search cost cA and observes the real-





A = xD + (1   )E [X];
where the acceptance cuto xD is determined by
E [X   xDjX  xD][1   F (xD)] = cA: (16)
Consider now for simplicity the symmetric setting where F = G; = 1    and
cA = cB = c. Member B's payo is given by:
vB = E [X] + (1   )E [XjX  xD]
The above expression assumes that member B can free ride on A's decision without
paying any search cost. Our conclusion about the value of forming committees under
specialization gains extra support if B also incurs some extra cost (of waiting, say)
while being outside the committee.
If A invites member B to join a committee that employs the unanimity rule, then






 + (1   )E [XjX  x
];
where the cuto x is determined by
E [X   x
jX  x
][1   F (x
)]
2 = c: (17)
Proposition 11 Suppose that F = G,  = 1    2 (1=2;1); cA = cB = c. Assume
that F has strict DMRL and bounded support with upper bound  < 1. Then the
acceptance standard goes down while the expected search duration goes up in the tran-
sition from specialized dictatorship to specialized unanimity. As long as the search
cost c is suciently small, both members gain by forming a committee.
30Proof. The fact that xD > x follows immediately from the two equilibrium condi-
tions (16 and 17), the DMRL property, and the fact that 1
1 F(x)  1
(1 F(x))2: Concern-






E [X   xDjX  xD] <

c






where the inequality follows from our DMRL assumption and xD > x.
For the second part, observe that the dierence (xD   x) tends to zero as c goes
to zero since both tend to the upper boundary of the attributes' support. As c tends







c!0[(1   )(E [XjX  x
]   E [X])   (xD   x
)]
= (1   )lim
c!0(E [XjX  x
]   E [X])
= (1   )(   E[X]) > 0






 + (1   )E [XjX  x
]   E [X]   (1   )E [XjX  xD])
= lim
c!0((x
   E [X]) + (1   )(E [XjX  x
]   E [XjX  xD]))
= 
 
   E [X]

> 0
Therefore, as c ! 0, both members gain from forming a committee. It is clear
by the above expressions, and by continuity, that both benets are positive for any
suciently small c.
The above proof also oers a glimpse into the distribution of gains from forming
a committee. When the degree of conict is small ( close to 1
2), the gains are more
evenly divided, whereas member B stands to gain more when the degree of conict
is relatively high ( close to 1). This is intuitive since a dictator that is informed
about the only dimension that is of interest to him (i.e., private values) has obviously
nothing to gain by forming a committee, while with private values member B gains
control of the dimension that is of interest to him by joining the committee, whereas
he had none before.
In this context, it is interesting to note that a more exible communication struc-
ture within a committee allows both an increase in the dictator's payo and sometimes
a Pareto-improvement over unanimity. Consider the above setting, and suppose that
dictator A can consult with member B before making a decision, without giving B
veto power. For simplicity, let us assume that member B can send either a \yes" or
a \no" message to member A; and let yB denote member B's cuto for sending the
31message \yes". Member A then uses two cutos: x1
A when member B says \yes" and
x0
A when member B says \no". Member A can implement the outcome of unanimity
by setting x1
A = x (his equilibrium cuto under unanimity) and x0
A =  (the upper
bound of the attribute's support), because the best response for member B is then
to set yB = y; his own equilibrium cuto under unanimity. Therefore, by optimizing
the two cutos x1
A and x0
A; the dictator A can do even better.16 Depending on the
parameters, even member B can be made better o.
We now oer two last comments on committee management. In symmetric set-
tings, we have shown above that members' utilities decrease in , the degree of
conict, with both complete or incomplete information. Without symmetry, it is not
necessarily true that a dictator is always better o by inviting a more moderate mem-
ber. The reason is that a member with more extreme preferences is more motivated to
maintain a high acceptance standard despite a high search cost. This can sometimes
be benecial through the higher quality of the taken decision. Here is an example
under specialization.
Example 6 Suppose that the dictator A with preference x + (1   )y,   1=2,
invites member B with preference x + (1   )y;   1=2; to join the committee.
Suppose that both F and G are uniform on [0;1], and that cB = 8cA = 8c. The
equilibrium cutos x and y are given by
x




2(1   )c; y





Member A's payo is










which is strictly decreasing in , as long as 8(1   ) > (1   ). Note that   1=2,
and that member B is more extreme when  is lower. Therefore, as long as the
dictator's preference is not too extreme, he is better o by inviting a more extreme
member B.
Similarly, it is not always better to invite agents with low search cost to join the
committee. Suppose member A has the option to choose his committee colleague
among several candidates. Suppose also that all candidates to join him have the
same preference with  = 1   , but have dierent search cost cB. Should A choose
a colleague with a high or low search cost? A general rule is that the cost has to
16This seems to be the modus operandi of most scientic journals: experts are consulted but the
decision is taken by an editor.
32be moderate. If it is too high, then member B may set a too low standard. If it is
too low, then member B may set a too high standard and hold member A up. A
precise answer to this question is distribution-specic. For example, in the exponential
distribution case, it is never optimal for member A to choose anyone with a higher
cost than himself, because then member B will become the dictator. It is also not
useful for A to choose a member B with a cost lower than himself, because then the
choice of member B does not matter, since A is the dictator. Thus, if it is optimal
for a dictator to form a committee, he should choose someone with the same search
cost as his own.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have introduced a fairly rich model for the analysis of committee search conducted
by generalists or by specialized, privately informed members with heterogenous pref-
erences dened on a multi-dimensional alternative space. The model generates a
wealth of implications that could, in principle, be tested in the eld or in the labora-
tory. We have also provided an array of helpful technical tools that seem well suited
for the problem at hand.
The following table summarizes our main ndings about the various eects of
increases in the degree of conict within committees (for unanimity the implications
shown are for symmetric settings).
acceptance standard individual payo search duration
unanimity with complete info. & & ?17
unanimity with incomplete info. % & %
dictatorship with complete info. % % ambiguous
dictatorship with incomplete info. % % %
We see several avenues for future research: 1) Consider committees with more
members (some specialized, some generalists), and the interplay between the number
of members and the dimension of the space of alternatives; 2) Consider dierent
aggregation rules, e.g., decisions by qualied majority; 3) Endogenize the choice of
information acquisition/specialization.
17We suspect that search duration may be increasing in  under stronger conditions than DMRL,
but we have not been able to prove this assertion so far. In Appendix A we prove a partial result in
this direction.
337 Appendix A
The analysis of the expected equilibrium search duration in the complete information,
unanimity case is somewhat complex. We prove the following partial result:
Proposition 12 Consider the symmetric, complete information case under unanim-
ity, where F = G;  = 1    , and cA = cB = c: Assume that X;Y have IFR,
and assume that 1
2X + 1
2Y MRL X: Then the expected search duration for  = 1
2 is
less than the expected search duration for  = 1: Moreover, if the dictator's expected
search duration increases in ; the expected search duration under unanimity cannot
decrease.18
Proof. Let z(1
2)  z(1) be the optimal cutos under unanimity for  = 1
2 and  = 1





































For  = 1 , the equilibrium condition is
E [X   z(1) j X  z(1)](PrfX  z(1)g)
2 = c:
















































The rst inequality follows because 1
2X + 1
2Y has the DMRL property, as shown in
Corollary 2.A.24 in Shaked and Shanthikumar [2007] { this is the reason why we need
the stronger IFR condition on the random variables X;Y: The second inequality holds
because we assumed 1
2X + 1
2Y MRL X:
For the second part, note that the dictator's cuto and the symmetric unanimity
cuto are the same for  = 1
2 under complete information. The same applies for
the expected search duration, since the equilibrium conditions are then the same.
18Recall that our examples show that the behavior of the expected search duration under dicta-
torship with complete information is ambiguous.
34By Proposition 2 we also know that the dictator's cuto is always higher than the
unanimity cuto. Under DMLR (which is implied by the IFR condition) this yields
that the search duration for  = 1 is higher under unanimity than under dictatorship.
The condition 1
2X + 1
2Y MRL X will be satised whenever the mean residual life
function of a weighted convolution of random variables is monotone in some measure
of the dispersion of the weights (e.g., Schur-convexity), but such results are not easy
to establish for some general class of distributions. A small literature proves such
results for particular distributions, e.g., Zhao and Balakrishnan [2009] who look at
convolutions of exponentials.
8 Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 5. By the analogy exposed in Remark 3, it is enough to
establish the existence and uniqueness of the solution for the system of two equations
determining the optimal cutos in the complete information case with private values,
i.e.,  = 1    = 1: This has been shown in Ferguson [2005]. For completeness, and























E[Y   y j Y  y]

:
Note that all threshold equilibria must satisfy the two equilibrium conditions (11) and
(12). If   1, then by the DMRL assumption, we must have x  0 and y  0. This
means we have a corner solution where the committee accepts any candidate, which
is indeed an equilibrium and essentially unique. From now on, we assume  > 1. The









 j Y  y
]:
Since F and G have strict DMRL, we can nd, for each  2 (;), a unique pair









 () j Y  y
 ()] = :
As  increases, both x () and y () decrease strictly and continuously, until one or
both of them reach the upper bound . At the same time, when  increases, and





(1   F (x ()))(1   G(y ()))















 ! +1 > ;
and when  = ,
1
P ()
= 1 < :
Therefore, there exists a unique value 0 2 (;) such that 0 = 1=P (0). Since each
 corresponds to an essentially unique pair of (x ();y ()), a cuto equilibrium
exists and is unique.
Proof of Proposition 8. We know that
1










 j Y  y
]
By X MRL Y we obtain that
8x; E[X   xjX  x]  E[Y   xjY  x]
Together with DMRL, this implies x  y: On the one hand, from (8) and (9) we
have
vB   vA = (y
   x
) + (1   )(E[X j X  x
]   E[Y j Y  y
])
On the other hand, from (10) we also have
vB   vA = (1   )E[X j X  x
] + E[Y j Y  y
]  
c




] + (1   )E[Y jY  y
]  
c
(1   F (x))(1   G(y))

= (1   2)(E[X j X  x
]   E[Y j Y  y
])
From the two representations above, and from y  x we obtain:
E[X j X  x




Because   1
2; we obtain
vB   vA = (1   2)(E[X j X  x
]   E[Y j Y  y
])  0
as desired.
36Proof of Proposition 9. Recall that e X HR X implies both e X MRL X and
e X ST X: Let F (e F) denote the distribution of X and Y ( e X and e Y ). We rst show
that x  e x. Suppose the opposite (x < e x) is true. Then from the equilibrium
conditions we have
1










E[X   e x





E[ e X   e x




(1   e F (e x))2
The two inequalities follow from DMRL assumption of X and the assumption e X MRL
X, respectively. Therefore, we must have F (x)  e F (e x). Since e X ST X, we also
have F (x)  e F (e x)  F (e x), which implies that x  e x, a contradiction.
In equilibrium we also have
vA = x
 + (1   )E[XjX  x
]
 e x
 + (1   )E[XjX  e x
]
 e x
 + (1   )E[ e Xj e X  e x
] = e vA
The rst inequality follows because vA is increasing in x, while the second inequality
follows by recalling that e X HR X implies [ e Xj e X  e x] ST [X j X  e x]:
The following technical Lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 10.




















































0 (x) > 0






. If z  =2, we can apply the symmetry of X





















































f (z)(y   z)f (y)dy
= 0






f (x). The case
of z < =2 can be proved analogously. Therefore, we have (z)  0 for all z.
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